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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the nature of disciplinary decisions of health professional regulatory
boards in response to commercial violations by licensees. Decisions of the Virginia Boards of
Dentistry, Medicine and Optometry are analyzed to assess the extent to which disciplinary
decisions appear to protect the economic interests of professionals versus the health, safety and
welfare of the public. Sanctions imposed on commercial and non-commercial violations are
compared. Given the criticism that regulatory boards are more concerned with commercial
practices rather than quality of care practices, it was expected that board disciplinary actions
would reflect this concern. The results indicate that there is no significant difference in the
severity of sanctions imposed on both types of violations. Commercial violations, when
compared with non-commercial violations, are not sanctioned more harshly by regulatory
boards. The implications for self-interest theories of professional regulation and policies
governing commercial practices of health professionals are discussed.
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ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL VIOLATIONS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONAL
REGULATORY BOARDS: A RESEARCH NOTE
INTRODUCTION
This article explores the nature of disciplinary decisions of health professional regulatory
boards in response to commercial violations by licensees. Decisions of the Virginia Boards of
Dentistry, Medicine and Optometry are analyzed to determine the nature of sanctions imposed on
commercial violations. Virginia is the focus of the paper because it was one of the first states to
evaluate systematically the enforcement function of its health professional boards.
Health professional regulatory boards are state administrative entities responsible for
establishing entry and performance standards and for enforcing statutes and regulations governing
professional practice. Professionals predominate or comprise the full membership of most boards.
Professional norms---economic, ethical and technical---codified in statutes and in board regulations
are critical in regulatory board decisions (Bayles, 1987).
Regulatory boards typically rely on three major types of credentialing mechanisms for
establishing entry standards: registration; certification and licensure. The least restrictive is
registration, which simply requires individuals to register with a state designated agency.
Certification allows the use of a title by anyone who meets specified criteria. Certification does not
restrict practice per se, but just restricts the use of particular titles associated with that practice.
Licensure, the most restrictive form of regulation, refers to the exclusive authority given to
individuals who meet specified criteria to practice a profession or occupation (Shimberg, 1982).
Certification, registration and licensure each impose different constraints and consequences
on their respective professional groups, with respect to the cost and quality of health care services
(Shimberg, 1984). Licensure is the form of regulation most relevant to this analysis of disciplinary
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decisions. The professional boards analyzed in this paper impose licensure laws and regulations on
the relevant professional group.

PROBLEM
Licensure, the form of regulation most associated with the term regulation for practice to
those with the required qualifications to practice. A major criticism is that the monopoly afforded by
licensure requirements increases costs with little improvement in the quality of health care service
(Gaumer, 1984; Hogan, 1983). In reviewing 97 studies on health professional regulations, Gaumer
concluded that easing licensure restrictions would reduce costs without endangering public safety
(Gaumer, 1984). Some observers even argue that licensure requirements are detrimental to the
delivery of and access to health care services because such requirements decrease the number of
practitioners. As a result, the costs of their services are higher (Carroll and Gaston, 1983; Hogan,
1983).
A second criticism of regulatory boards is that they overemphasize control of commercial
practices, such as advertising, rather than patient care practices. Regulations such as restrictions on
advertising have been criticized for not protecting the public's health, safety or welfare. Critics
charge that these regulations' major purpose is to restrict competition, thereby increasing the income
of licensed professionals (Cohen, 1980).
Are these criticisms of regulatory boards warranted? Are boards more interested in protecting
the economic interests of their colleagues than in protecting the health and safety of consumers?
This study attempts to answer these questions by analyzing regulatory boards' enforcement of
commercial practice restrictions. Health professional regulatory boards' disciplinary decisions are
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made in response to commercial violations are examined.
This study is significant for several reasons. First, empirical data on regulatory board
discipline has only recently been made available for analysis. Thus, there are few empirical studies
on disciplinary actions by regulatory boards. The results will provide empirical evidence to either
support or challenge the long-standing critique of regulatory boards with respect to disciplinary
decisions concerning commercial restrictions.
Second, this study's focus on one state and several boards provides a comparative basis to
analyze disciplinary outcomes of regulatory boards in other states. Thirdly, in addition to medicine,
this study includes dentistry and optometry, which have received almost no empirical study of their
disciplinary decisions. Finally, although considerable research has been done on the relationship
between licensure and commercial practices, a similar effort has not been directed toward an
empirical examination of the enforcement of commercial practice restrictions (for example, see
Begun, 1981; Gross, 1984).

OVERVIEW OF HEALTH PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE IN VIRGINIA
The administrative home of the boards is the Virginia Department of Health Professions,
which the Department provides administrative support for the regulatory function of the boards. The
boards have the sole authority and responsibility for licensing, regulating and disciplining licensed
health professionals in Virginia. Complaints investigated by the Department are forwarded to each
board to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegation of a violation. If the
boards determine there is sufficient evidence, they will conclude that a violation of a statute or
regulation has occurred and impose a sanction. If the evidence is deemed insufficient, the complaint
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is dismissed. Consequently, considerably more complaints are received and investigated by the
department than the resulting number of violations and sanctions.
State statutes provide general authority to all professional and occupational boards in order to
regulate and discipline practitioners; the statutes grant boards the authority to act to protect the
public. This general authority is supplemented by specific statutes and regulations for each
respective board. The general powers and duties of all health professional boards include the
authority to: (1) revoke, suspend, restrict or refuse to issue or renew a registration, certification or
license which such board has authority to issue for causes enumerated in applicable law and
regulations, and; (2) take appropriate disciplinary action for violations of applicable law and
regulations (VA. CODE ANN. '54.1-2400, 1984).
The authority to discipline practitioners is further defined in each board's statutes and
regulations. The penalties boards may impose for violations of statutes or regulations include
monetary penalties as well as restrictions on the right to practice. The boards in Virginia are
authorized to impose monetary penalties of up to $1,000 provided the licensee does not face criminal
prosecution (VA. CODE ANN. ' 54.1-2401). In addition, criminal penalties maay be imposed if
violations of statutes or regulations of Title 54 are Class 1 misdemeanors and are repeated violations
(three or more within 36 months), they constitute a Class 6 felony.

RESEARCH METHODS
The conceptual framework is derived from self-interest theories of professional regulation.
Within this theoretical formulation, professionals dominate regulatory inputs and outcomes by
"capturing" the regulatory mechanisms (Meier, 1985). Most professional regulatory boards for
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example, are composed solely of professionals. The few states which allow non-professionals to sit
on regulatory boards typically prevent them from voting on licensure or disciplinary matters.
Professionals may impose restrictions on entry into the profession, and impose other ethical
obligations which limit competition.
If boards are dominated by the regulated professions and if the regulated professions adopt
monopolistic policies and practices, then we would typically expect discipline to further complement
such policies and practices. Within the regulatory sub-system, the boards function in isolation from
other factors--such as consumer advocacy--which might serve to mitigate the tendency to protect the
interests of the profession. Protecting the interest of the profession, however, does not necessarily
conflict with protecting the interests of the public and the consumer. Therefore, we might find that
even though regulatory board actions further practitioners' interests, the public and consumers'
interests are adequately protected.
The analysis of disciplinary decisions builds on one of the first studies to examine
disciplinary decisions at the state level---Schneider's 1987 study "Influences on State Professional
Licensure Policy." Schneider's disciplinary categories of "strong" and "weak" were broadened to
include three major types of discipline available to regulatory boards: punitive, rehabilitative and
symbolic. These categories reflect both the degree of severity of sanctions as well as the approaches
to discipline that boards may take.
1. Symbolic sanctions indicate deviation from acceptable board standards, but do not limit
the right to practice. Examples include letters of warning, reprimands and cease and desist orders.
2. Rehabilitative sanctions are measures designed to improve the practitioner's capability for
safe practice, and include measures such as a continuing education requirement, special supervision
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for a specified period of time or referral to substance abuse counseling.
3. Punitive sanctions limit the practitioner's freedom to practice. Included in this category
are license suspensions, license revocations and financial penalties.
The data analyzed were collected by the Virginia Department of Health Professions for their
Complaint Tracking and Reporting System. Complaints of alleged violations are entered into this
system and tracked through the investigative and adjudicative phases of complaint resolution.
Descriptive statistics of complaints, violations and board findings were generated using the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The following hypothesis was tested using chisquare analysis and lambda:
Health professional regulatory boards are more likely to apply punitive sanctions to
commercial violations than non-commercial violations.
This hypothesis tests the extent to which trade restriction violations differ significantly from
other types of violations, in terms of sanctions imposed by the boards. The results will provide the
empirical evidence to support the claim that professional regulatory boards appear to give a higher
priority to protecting professionals' economic interests than to protecting the public's health, safety
and welfare.

RESULTS
The results fail to support the hypothesized relationship between the commercial violations
and punitive sanctions. The severity of disciplinary actions is commensurate with the seriousness of
commercial practices violations. Thus, there is little empirical evidence that regulatory boards are
unduly harsh in responding to commercial violations compared to other types of violations.
In general terms, regulatory boards were found to impose similar sanctions on commercial
8

and non-commercial violations. There is no significant difference in the nature of sanctions
imposed, regardless of the severity of the violation. Regulatory boards appear to mete out
appropriate punishment for commercial violations, given the severity of such violations. The least
serious violations receive the least severe sanctions.

Commercial Complaints Received
Sources such as licensees, consumers and professional organizations generated 220
complaints. After reviewing a complaint and the evidence, the boards determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to conclude a violation occurred. The boards received considerably more
complaints than the number of violations ultimately sanctioned. Of these complaints, only 21 %
(n=42) were substantiated as actual violations. That percentage varied among boards, from a high of
34% for the Dentistry Board to a low of 10% for the Optometry Board.
TABLE 1
COMMERCIAL COMPLAINTS RECEIVED AND ADJUDICATED AS VIOLATIONS
Board

Complaints

Violations as % of
Complaints

#

#

%

Dentistry

62

21

34.0

Medicine

81

13

16.0

Optometry

77

8

10.0

9

TOTAL

220

42

21.0

Although the overwhelming majority of commercial complaints are unsubstantiated by the
evidence, the boards appear to respond appropriately in that the least serious violations are given the
mildest penalties. The Department's ranking of commercial complaints in terms of seriousness is
shown in Table 2. Each priority code represents the Department's assessment of the danger the
alleged violation posed to the public or the consumer. Priority One represents the most serious
violations, whereas Priority Three represents violations with no direct threat to the well being of the
public or the consumer. Approximately three-fourths of complaints and violations fall into the
Priority Three category, according to Table 2.
TABLE 2
PRIORITY RANKINGS OF COMMERCIAL COMPLAINTS AND VIOLATIONS
DENTISTRY, MEDICINE AND OPTOMETRY
Priority Rank

Complaints
#

Violations

%

#

%

Priority One

12

5

4 10

Priority Two

50 23

6 14

Priority Three

158 72

32 76

220 100.0

42 100.0

TOTAL
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Sanctions Imposed on Commercial Violations
The majority of sanctions imposed on commercial violations fell into the non-punitive
category, according to Table 3. Non-punitive sanctions were applied to 80% of the commercial
violations compared with 65% of the non-commercial violations. Overall, there is no significant
difference in the nature of the sanctions imposed on commercial versus non-commercial violations.
TABLE 3
Type of Violation
Commercial
%
#

Non-Commercial
%
#

Punitive Sanctions

20

(6)

35

(66)

Non-Punitive Sanctions

80

(24)

65

(124)

100

(30)

100

(190)

TOTAL
Chi-Sq. Pr.
1.93 .16

N=220

Individual Boards
An examination of the results for each individual board indicates no support for the
hypothesis. The Board of Medicine imposed no punitive sanctions on commercial violations, but
imposed punitive sanctions on 34% of the non-commercial violations. The chi-square value of 1.29
with a probability of .26 and a lambda value of zero indicates the independence of these two
variables. Although the Board of Optometry imposed more punitive sanctions on commercial
violations (86%) than on non-commercial violations (77%), the difference is not significant. The
chi-square value of .68 indicates an independent relationship between the two variables.
An analysis of the Board of Dentistry findings, shown in Table 4, resulted in a chi-square
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value of 5.30 with a probability of .02, suggesting that the nature of the sanction may not be
independent of the nature of the violation. However, the lambda value of zero supports the idea that
knowing whether a violation is commercial versus non-commercial does not reduce the error in
predicting the type of sanction imposed.
TABLE 4
Association Between Type of Violation and Type of Sanction for
Commercial Violations
Hypothesis
Hyp. #1

Board

Ind.Var.

Dep.Var.
Type b
of Sanction

Chi-Sq.
Value

Lambda

1.93

.00

All

Type of a
Violation

Dentistry

Type of Violation

Type of Sanction

5.30*

.00

Medicine

Type of Violation

Type of Sanction

1.29

.00

Optometry

Type of Violation

Type of Sanction

.16

.00

*p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001
a Commercial Violation b Punitive Sanction
CONCLUSION
Commercial violations are more likely than non-commercial violations to receive nonpunitive sanctions, except in Optometry cases. The Boards of Medicine and Dentistry both imposed
only non-punitive sanctions on commercial violations. Although Optometry imposed more punitive
sanctions on commercial than non-commercial violations, there was no statistically significant
difference in the nature of sanctions imposed on the two types of violations.
Since three-fourths of commercial violations are categorized among the least serious
violations (Priority 3), the boards responded appropriately by imposing milder sanctions. In this
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instance, boards do not appear to take a punitive stance toward commercial violations.
Given the extensive criticism of boards' preoccupation with commercial practices rather than
quality of care practices, it was expected that board disciplinary actions would reflect this concern.
However, the evidence here suggests there is no particular targeting of commercial violations for
harsh punishment, at least in terms of the disciplinary decisions of the Boards of Dentistry, Medicine
and Optometry in Virginia.
Theoretical assumptions about boards protecting the economic interests of licensees do not
appear to be reflected in disciplinary decisions. Perhaps professional' economic interests are a major
consideration for a particular profession to impose licensure and entry requirements. However, once
these goals are accomplished, economic considerations play a less important role in the enforcement
of statutes and regulations governing the profession.
An alternative explanation may be that regulatory boards are sensitized to criticisms asserting
that boards have emphasized issues such as restrictions on competition and advertising, and have
neglected patient-centered standards of professional practice. The diminished importance of
economic concerns may have resulted from attacks on the anti-competitive aspects of professional
licensure reflected in Federal Trade Commission decisions, in lawsuits against the American
Medical Association, and in state and county medical societies. Federal anti-trust policies and
successful anti-trust suits may have had the desired effect of discouraging sanctions of violations
related primarily to the commercial aspects of professional practice. As a result, commercial
violations may no longer be punished as harshly as they may have been in the past.
Regulations governing advertising and trade practices may not be critical factors in
protecting the public's welfare. All of the commercial violations dealt with by these three boards
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were classified as among the least serious threats to the public. Furthermore, the second largest
group of complaints dismissed were alleged commercial violations. Board and staff time might be
better spent exploring consumer concerns rather than investigating and adjudicating allegations of
commercial violations.
Health professionals, however, are unlikely to support reduced restrictions on advertising and
trade practices. Many argue that regulation ensures high quality care delivered by the most
competent practitioners. Such people believe that regulations such as restrictions on advertising are
essential to protecting the consumer from misleading information about health care services
(Galusha, 1989).
The nature of disciplinary decisions related to commercial violations have policy and
administrative implications for health professional regulators. Overall, disciplinary decisions appear
to match commercial violations apprpriately; the severity of the penalty is in line with the
seriousness of the infraction. However, the extent to which boards should address such violations is
still an open question. Given the constraints of limited resources, board members and staff might be
more effective if time, money and energy were directed toward patient-centered violations.
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